One approach towards basing public-key encryption (PKE) schemes on weak and credible assumptions is to build "stronger" or more general schemes generically from "weaker" or more restricted ones. One particular line of work in this context was initiated by Myers and shelat (FOCS '09) and continued by Hohenberger, Lewko, and Waters (Eurocrypt '12), who provide constructions of multi-bit CCA-secure PKE from single-bit CCA-secure PKE.
the full variant of said code achieves continuous non-malleability against full bit-wise tampering. This constitutes the first information-theoretically secure continuously non-malleable code, a contribution that we believe is of independent interest, and forms the technical core of this paper.
Techniques and Contributions
Constructive cryptography [39] . Security statements for cryptographic schemes can be stated as constructions of a "stronger" or more useful desired resource from a "weaker" or more restricted assumed one. Two such construction steps can be composed, i.e., if a protocol π constructs a resource S from an assumed resource R, denoted by R π ==⇒ S, and, additionally, a protocol ψ assumes resource S and constructs a resource T , then the composition theorem of constructive cryptography (see Appendix A) states that the composed protocol, denoted ψ •π, constructs resource T from R. The resources considered in this work are different types of communication channels between two parties A and B; a channel is a resource that involves three entities: the sender, the receiver, and a (potential) attacker E.
We use and extend the notation by [43] , denoting different types of channels by different arrow symbols. A confidential channel (later denoted − → →•) hides the messages sent by A from the attacker E but potentially allows her to inject independent messages; an authenticated channel (later denoted •− → → ) is dual to the confidential channel in that it potentially leaks the message to the attacker but prevents modifications and injections; an insecure channel (later denoted − → → ) protects neither the confidentiality nor the authenticity. In all cases, the double arrow head indicates that the channel can be used to transmit multiple messages. A single arrow head, instead, means that channels are single-use. All channels used within this work are described formally in Appendix B.
Warm-up: dealing with the malleability of the one-time pad. To illustrate the intuition behind our approach, consider the following simple example: The one-time pad allows to encrypt an n-bit message m using an n-bit shared key κ by computing the ciphertext e = m ⊕ κ. If e is sent via an insecure channel, an attacker can replace it by a different ciphertext e , in which case the receiver will compute m = e ⊕ κ = m ⊕ (e ⊕ e ). This can be seen, as described in [42] , as constructing from an insecure channel and a shared secret n-bit key an "XOR-malleable" channel, denoted − −⊕→•, which is confidential but allows the attacker to specify a mask δ ∈ {0, 1} n (= e ⊕ e ) to be XORed to the transmitted message.
Non-malleable codes can be used to deal with the XOR-malleability. To transmit a k-bit message m, we encode m with a (k, n)-bit non-malleable code, obtaining an n-bit codeword c, which we transmit via the XOR-malleable channel − −⊕→•. Since by XORing a mask δ to a codeword transmitted via − −⊕→• the attacker can influence the value of each bit of the codeword only independently, a code that is non-malleable w.r.t. the function class F bit , which (in particular) allows to either "keep" or "flip" each bit of a codeword only individually, is sufficient. Indeed, the non-malleability of the code implies that the decoded message will be either the original message or a completely unrelated value, which is the same guarantee as formulated by the single-message confidential channel (denoted −→•), and hence using the code, one achieves the construction − −⊕→• ==⇒ −→•.
A more detailed treatment and a formalization of this example appears in Appendix C; suitable non-malleable codes are described in [14, 23, 9] .
Dealing with the malleability of multiple single-bit encryptions. Intuitively, CCA encryption guarantees that an attacker, by modifying a particular ciphertext, can either leave the message contained therein intact or replace it by an independently created one. This intuition is formally captured by the confidential channel − → →•: at the attacker interface E, it allows to either forward messages sent by A or to inject independent messages. In [12] , it is shown how CCA-secure encryption can be used to construct a confidential channel − → →• from A to B from an authenticated channel ←−• from B to A and an insecure channel − → → from A to B. As shown in Section 3, this and the composition theorem imply that using n independent single-bit PKE schemes, one can construct n (independent) instances of the single-bit confidential channel
The remaining step is showing how to achieve the construction
for some k > 1. Then, by the composition theorem, plugging these two steps together yields a protocol m-pke that constructs a k-bit confidential channel from an authenticated channel and an insecure channel. To achieve construction (1), we use non-malleable codes. The fact that the channels are multipleuse leads to two important differences to the one-time-pad example above: First, the attacker can fabricate multiple codewords, which are then decoded. Second, each bit of such a codeword can be created by combining any of the bits sent by A over the corresponding channel. These capabilities can be formally captured by a particular class F copy of tampering functions. We prove in Section 3 that any code that is continuously non-malleable w.r.t. F copy can be used to achieve (1) .
Unfortunately, we show in Appendix F that any code, in order to satisfy the above type of nonmalleability, has to "self-destruct" in the event of a decoding error. For the application in the setting of public-key encryption, this means that the decryption algorithm of the receiver B also has to deny processing any further ciphertext once the code self-destructs.
Self-destruct CCA security. In Section 3 we show how the protocol m-pke can be seen as a PKE scheme that achieves self-destruct CCA security (SD-CCA) and show that the single-bit confidential channel 1-bit − → →• can also be constructed using a single-bit SD-CCA scheme (instead of a CCA-secure one). Thus, overall we obtain a way to transform 1-bit SD-CCA-secure PKE into multi-bit SD-CCA-secure PKE. For comparison we also provide a direct, entirely game-based proof that combining a single-bit SD-CCA PKE scheme with a non-malleable code as above yields a multi-bit SD-CCA scheme (see Appendix D).
SD-CCA is a (weaker) CCA variant that allows the scheme to self-destruct in case it detects an invalid ciphertext. The standard CCA game can easily be extended to include the self-destruct mode of the decryption: the decryption oracle keeps answering decryption queries as long as no invalid ciphertext (i.e., a ciphertext upon which the decryption algorithm outputs an error symbol) is received; after such an event occurs, no further decryption query is answered.
The guarantees of SD-CCA are perhaps best understood if compared to the q-bounded CCA notion by [10] . While q-CCA allows an a priori determined number q of decryption queries, SD-CCA allows an arbitrary number of valid decryption queries and one invalid query. From a practical viewpoint, an attacker can efficiently violate the availability with a scheme of either notion. However, as long as no invalid ciphertexts are received, an SD-CCA scheme can run indefinitely, whereas a q-CCA scheme has to necessarily stop after q decryptions.
Subsequent work [13] shows that SD-CCA security can in fact be achieved from CPA security only, by generalizing a technique by Choi et al. [10] . The resulting scheme, however, is considerably less efficient than the one we provide in this paper. In [13] , the authors also study the relation between SD-CCA and other standard security notions and discuss possible applications.
Continuous non-malleability w.r.t. F copy . The class F copy can be seen as a multi-encoding version of the function class F set , which consists of functions that tamper with every bit of an encoding individually and may either leave it unchanged or replace it by a fixed value. In Section 4 we build a continuously non-malleable code w.r.t. F copy ; the code consists of a linear error-correcting secret sharing (LECSS) scheme and can be seen as a simplified version of the code in [23] . The security proof of the code proceeds in two steps: First, we prove that it is continuously non-malleable w.r.t. F set against tampering with a single encoding; the main challenge in this proof is showing that by repeatedly tampering with an encoding, an attacker cannot infer (too much) useful information about it. Then, we show that if a code is continuously non-malleable w.r.t. F copy against tampering with a single encoding, then it is also adaptively continuously non-malleable w.r.t. F copy , i.e., against tampering with many encodings simultaneously. In addition, in Appendix G, we also show that the full version of the code by [23] is non-malleable against full bit-wise tampering (i.e., when additionally the tamper function is allowed to flip bits of an encoding). These are the main technical contributions of this work.
More Details on Related Work
The work of Hohenberger et al. [33] -building on the work of Myers and shelat [47] -describes a multi-bit CCA-secure encrytion scheme from a single-bit CCA-secure one, a CPA-secure one, and a 1-query-bounded CCA-secure one. Their scheme is rather sophisticated and has a somewhat circular structure, requiring a complex security proof. The public key is of the form pk = (pk in , pk A , pk B ), where the "inner" public key pk in is the public key of a DCCA secure PKE scheme, and the "outer" public keys pk A and pk B are, respectively, the public key of a 1-bounded CCA and a CPA secure PKE scheme. To encrypt a k-bit message m one first encrypts a tuple (r A , r B , m), using the "inner" public key, obtaining a ciphertext e in , where r A and r B are thought as being the randomness for the "outer" encryption scheme. Next, one has to encrypt e in under the "outer" public key pk A (resp. pk B ) using randomness r A (resp. r B ) and thus obtaining a ciphertext e A (resp. e B ). The output ciphertext is e = (e A , e B ).
To use the above scheme, we have to instantiate the DCCA, 1-bounded CCA and CPA components. As argued in [33] , all schemes can be instantiated using a single-bit CCA-secure PKE scheme yielding a fully black-box construction of a multi-bit CCA-secure PKE from a single-bit CCA-secure PKE. Let us denote with l p (resp., l e ) the bit-length of the public key (resp., the ciphertext) for the singlebit CCA-secure PKE scheme. When we refer to the construction of [15] for the 1-bounded CCA component, we get a public key of size roughly (3 + 16s) · l p for the public key and (k + 2s) · 4s · l 2 e for the ciphertext, for security parameter s. 2 In contrast, our scheme instantiated with the information-theoretic LECSS scheme of [23] has a ciphertext of length ≈ 5k · l e and a public key of length k · l p . Note that the length of the public key depends on the length of the message, as we need independent public keys for each encrypted bit (whereas the DCCA scheme can use always the same public key). However, we observe that when k is not too large, e.g. in case the PKE scheme is used as a key encapsulation mechanism, we would have k ≈ s yielding public keys of comparable size. On the negative side, recall that our construction needs to self-destruct in case an invalid ciphertext is processed, which is not required in [33] , and thus our construction only achieves SD-CCA security and not full-blown CCA security.
As shown in [12] , the constructive security statement for public-key encryption corresponds to replayable CCA security (RCCA), a notion proposed by Canetti et al. [6] . Hence, our scheme actually achieves replayable self-destruct CCA security (SD-RCCA)-see Appendix D. We remark, however, that if one is interested in SD-CCA security, this can be achieved generically from SD-RCCA security using the transformation in [6] .
Non-malleable codes. Beyond the constructions of [23, 9, 25] , non-malleable codes exists against block-wise tampering [11] , against bit-wise tampering and permutations [5, 4] , against split-state tampering-both information-theoretic [22, 2, 7, 3, 1] and computational [38, 18] -and in a setting where the computational complexity of the tampering functions is limited [8, 27, 34] . We stress that the typical application of non-malleable codes is to protect cryptographic schemes against memory tampering (see, e.g., [29, 23, 19, 20] ). A further application of non-malleable codes has been shown by Agrawal et al. [4] (in concurrent and independent work). They show that one can obtain a non-malleable multi-bit commitment scheme from a non-malleable single-bit commitment scheme by encoding the value with a (specific) non-malleable code and then committing to the codeword bits. Despite the similarity of the approaches, the techniques applied in their paper differ heavily from ours. The class of tampering functions the code has to protect against is different, and we additionally need continuous non-malleability to handle multiple decryption queries (this is not required for the commitment case).
Preliminaries

Systems: Resources and Converters, Distinguishers, and Reductions
Resources and converters. We use the concepts and terminology of abstract [41] and constructive cryptography [39] . The resources we consider are different types of communication channels, which are systems with three interfaces labeled by A, B, and E. A converter is a two-interface system which is directed in that it has an inside and an outside interface. Converters model protocol engines that are used by the parties, and using a protocol is modeled by connecting the party's interface of the resource to the inside interface of the converter (which hides those two interfaces) and using the outside interface of the converter instead. We generally use upper-case, bold-face letters (e.g., R, S) or channel symbols (e.g., •− → → ) to denote resources or single-interface systems and lower-case Greek letters (e.g., α, β) or sans-serif fonts (e.g., enc, dec) for converters. We denote by Φ the set of all resources and by Σ the set of all converters.
For I ∈ {A, B, E}, a resource R ∈ Φ, and a converter α ∈ Σ, the expression α I R denotes the composite system obtained by connecting the inside interface of α to interface I of R; the outside interface of α becomes the I-interface of the composite system. The system α I R is again a resource (cf. Figure 2 Two converters α and β can be composed serially by connecting the inside interface of β to the outside interface of α, written β • α, with the effect that (β • α) I R = β I α I R. Moreover, converters can also be taken in parallel, denoted by [α, β] , with the effect that [α, β] I [R, S] = [α I R, β I S]. We assume the existence of an identity converter id ∈ Σ with id I R = R for all resources R ∈ Φ and interfaces I ∈ {A, B, E} and of a special converter ⊥ ∈ Σ with an inactive outside interface.
Distinguishers.
A distinguisher D connects to all interfaces of a resource U and outputs a single bit at the end of its interaction with U. The expression DU defines a binary random variable corresponding to the output of D when interacting with U, and the distinguishing advantage of a distinguisher D on two systems U and V is defined as
The distinguishing advantage measures how much the output distribution of D differs when it is connected to either U or V. Note that the distinguishing advantage is a pseudo-metric. 3 Reductions. When relating two distinguishing problems, it is convenient to use a special type of system C that translates one setting into the other. Formally, C is a converter that has an inside and an outside interface. When it is connected to a system S, which is denoted by CS, the inside interface of C connects to the (merged) interface(s) of S and the outside interface of C is the interface of the composed system. C is called a reduction system (or simply reduction).
To reduce distinguishing two systems S, T to distinguishing two systems U, V, one exhibits a reduction C such that CS ≡ U and CT ≡ V. Then, for all distinguishers D, we have ∆ D (U, V) = ∆ D (CS, CT) = ∆ DC (S, T). The last equality follows from the fact that C can also be thought of as being part of the distinguisher (which follows from the composition-order independence [41] ).
Discrete Systems
The behavior of systems can be formalized by random systems as in [45, 40] 
is the probability of observing the outputs y i = (y 1 , . . . , y i ) given the inputs x i = (x 1 , . . . , x i ). If for two systems R and S,
for all i and for all parameters where both are defined, they are called equivalent, denoted by R ≡ S.
In that case, ∆ D (R, S) = 0 for all distinguishers D.
A system S can be extended by a so-called monotone binary output (or MBO) B, which is an additional one-bit output B 1 , B 2 , . . . with the property that B i = 1 implies B i+1 = 1 for all i. 4 The enhanced system is denoted byŜ, and its behavior is described by the sequence (pŜ Y i ,B i |X i ) i≥1 . If for two systemsR andŜ with MBOs,
for all i, they are called game equivalent, which is denoted byR g ≡Ŝ. In such a case, ∆ D (R, S) ≤ Γ D (R) = Γ D (Ŝ), where Γ D (R) denotes the probability that D provokes the MBO. For more details and a proof of this fact, consult [40] . 5 
The Notion of Construction
We formalize the security of protocols via the notion of construction, introduced in [39]: Definition 1. Let Φ and Σ be as above, and let ε 1 and ε 2 be two functions mapping each distinguisher D to a real number in [0, 1]. A protocol π = (π 1 , π 2 ) ∈ Σ 2 constructs resource S ∈ Φ from resource R ∈ Φ with distance (ε 1 , ε 2 ) and with respect the simulator σ ∈ Σ, denoted 6 R π,σ,(ε 1 ,ε 2 ) ==⇒ S, if for all distinguishers D,
The availability condition captures that a protocol must correctly implement the functionality of the constructed resource in the absence of the attacker. The security condition models the requirement that everything the attacker can achieve in the setting with the assumed resource and the protocol, she can also accomplish in the setting with the constructed resource (using the simulator to translate the behavior). The notion of construction composes; details can be found in Appendix A.
Public-Key Encryption Schemes
A public-key encryption (PKE) scheme with message space M ⊆ {0, 1} * and ciphertext space E is defined as three algorithms Π = (K, E, D), where the key-generation algorithm K outputs a key pair (pk, sk), the (probabilistic) encryption algorithm E takes a message m ∈ M and a public key pk and outputs a ciphertext e ← E pk (m), and the decryption algorithm takes a ciphertext e ∈ E and a secret key sk and outputs a plaintext m ← D sk (e). The output of the decryption algorithm can be the special symbol , indicating an invalid ciphertext. A PKE scheme is correct if m = D sk (E pk (m)) (with probability 1 over the randomness in the encryption algorithm) for all messages m and all key pairs (pk, sk) generated by K.
We introduce security notions for PKE schemes as we need them. 4 In other words, once the MBO is 1, it cannot return to 0. 5 Intuitively, this means that in order to distinguish the two systems, D has to provoke the MBO. 6 In less formal contexts, we sometimes drop the superscripts on ==⇒ .
6 System S real
x ← x (j) out x Figure 1 : Systems S real F and S simu F ,τ defining adaptive continuous non-malleability of (Enc, Dec). The command self -destruct has the effect that is output and all future queries are answered by .
Continuously Non-Malleable Codes
Non-malleable codes, introduced in [23] , are coding schemes that protect the encoded messages against certain classes of adversarially chosen modifications, in the sense that the decoding will result either in the original message or in an unrelated value. Basic non-malleable codes [23] provide the above guarantee in a context where the adversary is allowed to modify a (random) codeword c (of a message of his choice) by specifying a function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n from a particular function class F and observe the output of the decoding algorithm applied to the tampered codeword f (c).
Continuous non-malleability, introduced in [25] , extends this guarantee to the case where the adversary is allowed to perform multiple such modifications of a target codeword c. That is, he can repeatedly and adaptively specify functions f ∈ F and see the decoding of the tampered codeword f (c). The functions f specified by the adversary are always applied to the same c.
The notion of adaptive continuous non-malleability considered here is an extension of continuous non-malleability in that the adversary is allowed to (adaptively) specify multiple messages x (1) , x (2) , . . . and the functions may depend on all of the corresponding codewords c (1) , c (2) , . . .. That is, the class F is actually a sequence (F (i) ) i≥1 of function families with F (i) ⊆ {f | f : ({0, 1} n ) i → {0, 1} n }, and after encoding i messages, the adversary chooses functions from F (i) . A similar adaptive notion has been already considered for continuous strong non-malleability in the split-state model [26] .
Formally, adaptive continuous non-malleability w.r.t. F is defined by comparing the two random systems S real F and S simu F ,τ defined in Figure 1 . Both systems process encode and tamper queries from a distinguisher D, whose objective is to tell the two systems apart.
System S real F produces a random encoding c (i) of each message x (i) specified by D and allows D to repeatedly issue tampering functions f ∈ F (i) . For each such query, S real F computes the modified codeword c = f (c (1) , . . . , c (i) ) and outputs Dec(c ). Whenever Dec(c ) = , the system enters a self-destruct mode, in which all further queries are replied to by . The second random system, S simu F ,τ , features a simulator τ , which is allowed to keep state. The simulator repeatedly takes a tampering function and outputs either a message x , (same, v) for v ∈ {1, . . . , i}, or , where (same, v) is used by τ to indicate that (it believes that) the tampering results in an n-bit string that decodes to the v th message encoded. System S simu F ,τ outputs whatever τ outputs, except that (same, v) is replaced by the v th message x (v) specified by D. Moreover, in case of , S simu F ,τ self-destructs.
For , q ∈ N, S real F , ,q is the system that behaves as S real F except that only the first encode-queries and the first q tamper-queries are handled (and similarly for S simu F ,τ, ,q and S simu F ,τ ). Note that by setting = 1, one recovers continuous non-malleability as defined in [25] , 7 and by additionally setting q = 1 the original definition of non-malleability.
Definition 3 (Continuous non-malleability). Consider a sequence F = (F (i) ) i≥1 of function families F (i) ⊆ {f | f : ({0, 1} n ) i → {0, 1} n } and let , q ∈ N. A coding scheme (Enc, Dec) is adaptively continuously (F, ε, , q)-non-malleable (or simply (F, ε, , q)-non-malleable) if there exists a simulator τ such that ∆ D (S real F , ,q , S simu F ,τ, ,q ) ≤ ε for all distinguishers D.
3 From Single-Bit to Multi-Bit Channels
In this section we examine the question of domain extension for CCA-secure public-key encryption (PKE) via the following intuitive non-malleable code based approach: first encode a k-bit message using a non-malleable (k, n)-code to protect its integrity, obtaining an n-bit codeword c; then encrypt c bit-wise using n independent public keys for a single-bit CCA-secure PKE. We observe that the adversary's ability of asking multiple decryption queries requires to opt for continuously non-malleable codes. The self-destruct property of these codes, however, translates to the resulting PKE scheme, and thus we achieve domain extension only for schemes with so-called self-destruct CCA security, a variant of CCA security where the decryption oracle stops working after the attacker submits an invalid ciphertext; this variant is defined more precisely in Section D.1. We stress that the need for self-destruct is not a limitation of the security proof of our code (cf. Section 4), as continuous non-malleability for the class of tampering functions required for the above transformation to work is impossible without the self-destruct property (cf. Appendix F for details).
As shown below, phrasing PKE domain extension using the paradigm of constructive cryptography allows to decompose the problem into two independent parts: The first part includes a (canonical) reduction to the SD-CCA security of the single-bit PKE scheme, whereas the second part, which involves non-malleable codes, is purely information-theoretic. The two parts can then be combined to obtain a single protocol, whose security follows from the composition theorem. We also show how the resulting protocol can be understood as a PKE scheme and that it achieves SD-CCA security.
All channel resources that appear in this section are formally defined in Section B of the appendix; to understand the statements and explanations below, the informal descriptions given in Section 1.2 are sufficient, however.
Single-Bit PKE Viewed Constructively
Following the proof of [12, Theorem 2], one can show that a 1-bit SD-CCA-secure PKE scheme can be used to design a protocol that achieves the construction
where, in a nutshell, the receiver's protocol converter is responsible for key generation, decryption, as well as self-destructing, the sender's protocol converter for encryption, and where the authenticated channel ←−• is used for the transmission of the public key and the insecure channel − → → for sending ciphertexts. The constructed single-bit confidential channel 1-bit − → →• hides all messages sent by the sender from the attacker and allows the attacker to either deliver already sent messages or to inject independent messages. This captures the intuitive (SD-)CCA guarantee that an attacker, by modifying a particular ciphertext, can either leave the message contained therein intact or replace it by an independently created one.
Using n independent copies of the single-bit scheme in parallel yields a protocol 1-pke that achieves:
which follows almost directly from the composition theorem. More details can be found in Appendix D.2. 
The protocol is secure if the two systems are indistinguishable.
Tying the Channels Together
We now show how to construct, using an adaptive continuously non-malleable (k, n)-code (cf. Section 2.5), a (single) k-bit confidential channel from the n independent single-bit confidential channels constructed in the previous section. This is achieved by having the sender encode the message with the non-malleable code and sending the resulting codeword over the 1-bit channels (bit-by-bit), while the receiver decodes all n-bit strings received via these channels. Additionally, due to the self-destruct property of continuously non-malleable codes, the receiver must stop decoding once an invalid codeword has been received. More precisely, let (Enc, Dec) be a (k, n)-coding scheme and consider the following protocol nmc = (encode, decode): Converter encode encodes every message m ∈ {0, 1} k input at its outside interface with fresh randomness, resulting in an n-bit encoding c = c 1 · · · c n ← Enc(m). Then, for i = 1, . . . , n, it outputs bit c i to the i th channel at the inside interface. Converter decode, whenever it receives an nbit string c = c 1 · · · c n (where the i th bit c i was received on the i th channel), it computes m ← Dec(c ) and outputs m at the outside interface. If m = , it implements the self-destruct mode, i.e., it answers all future encodings received at the inside interface by outputting at the outside interface.
The goal is now to show that protocol nmc achieves the construction
The required non-malleability. By inspecting both sides of Figure 2 , it becomes immediately apparent why adaptive continuously non-malleable codes are the proper choice to achieve construction (4): On the left-hand side, the distinguisher can repeatedly input messages m (i) at interface A, which results in encodings c (i) being input (bit-by-bit) into the single-bit channels. Using the E-interfaces of these channels, the distinguisher can repeatedly see the decoding of an n-bit string c = c 1 · · · c n at interface B, where each bit c j results from either forwarding one of the bits already in the j th channel or from injecting a fresh bit that is either 0 or 1. Put differently, the distinguisher can effectively launch tampering attacks using functions from
copy is characterized by a vector χ(f ) = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) where f j ∈ {zero, one, copy 1 , . . . , copy i }, with the meaning that f takes as input i codewords (c (1) , . . . , c (i) ) and outputs an n-bit string c = c 1 · · · c n in which each bit c j is either set to 0 (zero), set to 1 (one), or copied from the j th bit in a codeword c (v) (copy v ) for v ∈ {1, . . . , i}.
On the right-hand side, the distinguisher may again input messages m (i) at interface A-to the kbit confidential channel. At interface E, this channel only allows to either deliver entire k-bit messages already sent by A or to inject independent messages. The simulator σ required to prove (4) needs to simulate the E-interfaces of the single-bit confidential channels at its outside interface and, based solely on what is input at these interfaces, decide whether to forward or inject a message, which corresponds exactly to the task of the simulator τ in the non-malleability experiment (cf. Section 2.5).
Theorem 1 below formalizes this correspondence; its proof is essentially a technicality: one merely needs to "translate" between the channel settings and the non-malleability experiment. For completeness it is provided in full detail in Appendix D.3.
where the additional superscripts , q on a channel mean that it only processes the first queries at the A-interface and only the firstueries at the E-interface.
Plugging It Together
The composition theorem of constructive cryptography (cf. Appendix A) implies that the protocol m-pke = nmc • 1-pke resulting from composing the protocols 1-pke and nmc for transformations (3) and (4), respectively, achieves
Protocol m-pke corresponds (in a straight-forward manner) to a PKE scheme Π that achieves SD-CCA security, as shown in Section D.4 of the appendix. 8 Hence, overall, we obtain a domain extension technique for SD-CCA-secure PKE schemes.
Furthermore, in Section D.5, we also provide a direct game-based proof of the fact that combining single-bit SD-CCA-secure PKE with a non-malleable code as shown above yields a multi-bit SD-CCA-secure PKE scheme. That proof is a hybrid argument and is obtained by "unwrapping" the concatenation of the statements in this section. The modular nature and the intuitive simplicity of the proofs are lost, however.
Continuous Non-Malleability against Bit-Wise Tampering
In this section, we describe a code that is adaptively continuously non-malleable w.r.t. F copy . For completeness, in Appendix G, we also provide a code secure w.r.t. to an extension F copy of F copy that allows bit-flips as well.
The transition from continuous to adaptive continuous non-malleability w.r.t. F copy is achieved generically:
The proof of Theorem 2 appears in Appendix E. It remains to construct a continuously nonmalleable code that is secure against tampering with a single encoding, which we do below.
Continuous non-malleability for single encoding. The code is based on a linear error-correcting secret-sharing (LECSS). The use of a LECSS is inspired by the work of [23] , who proposed a (noncontinuous) non-malleable code against bit-wise tampering based on a LECSS and, additionally, an AMD-code (cf. Appendix G), where the AMD-code essentially handles bit-flips. As we do not need to provide non-malleability against bit-flips, using only the LECSS is sufficient for our purposes. The following definition is taken from [23] : 9 Definition 4 (LECSS code). A (k, n)-coding scheme (Enc, Dec) is a (d, t)-linear error-correcting secret-sharing (LECSS) code if the following properties hold:
• Linearity: For all c ∈ {0, 1} n such that Dec(c) = ⊥, all δ ∈ {0, 1} n , we have
• Secrecy t: For any fixed x ∈ {0, 1} k , the bits of Enc(x) are individually uniform and t-wise independent (over the randomness in the encoding).
It turns out that a LECSS code is already continuously non-malleable with respect to F copy :
For brevity, we write F set for F (1) copy below, with the idea that the tampering functions in F (1) copy only allow to keep a bit or to set it to 0 or to 1. More formally, a function f ∈ F set can be characterized by a vector χ(f ) = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) where f i ∈ {zero, one, keep}, with the meaning that f takes as input a codeword c and outputs a codeword c = c 1 · · · c n in which each bit is either set to 0 (zero), set to 1 (one), or left unchanged (keep).
For the proof of Theorem 3, fix q ∈ N and some distinguisher D. For the remainder of this section, let F := F set , S real F := S real F ,1,q and S simu F ,τ := S simu F ,τ,1,q (for a simulator τ to be determined). Handling Middle Queries. Consider the hybrid system H that proceeds as S real F , except that as soon as D specifies a middle query f , H self-destructs, i.e., answers f and all subsequent queries by .
Proof. Define a successful middle query to be a middle query that does not decode to . On both systems S real F and H, one can define an MBO B (cf. Section 2.2) that is provoked if and only if the first middle query is successful and the self-destruct has not been provoked up to that point.
Clearly, S real F and H behave identically until MBO B is provoked, thusŜ real F g ≡Ĥ, and
Towards bounding Γ D (Ŝ real F ), note first that adaptivity does not help in provoking B: For any distinguisher D, there exists a non-adaptive distinguisher D with
D proceeds as follows: First, it (internally) interacts with D only. Initially, it stores the message x output by D internally. Whenever D outputs a low query, D answers with x. Whenever D outputs a high query f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ), D checks whether there exists a codeword c * that agrees with f in positions i where f i ∈ {zero, one}. If it exists, it answers with Dec(c * ), otherwise with . As soon as D specifies a middle query, D stops its interaction with D and sends x and all the queries toŜ real F . 11
To prove (6) , fix all randomness in experiment D S real F , i.e., the coins of D (inside D ) and the randomness of the encoding (inside S real F ). Suppose D would provoke B in the direct interaction with S real F . In that case all the answers by D are equal to the answers by S real F . This is due to the fact that the distance of the LECSS is d > t; a successful low query must therefore result in the original message x and a successful high query in Dec(c * ). Thus, whenever D provokes B, D provokes it as well.
It remains to analyze the success probability of non-adaptive distinguishers D . Fix the coins of D ; this determines the tamper queries. Suppose there is at least one middle case, as otherwise B is trivially not provoked. The middle case's success probability can be analyzed as in [23, Theorem 4.1] , which leads to
(recall that the MBO cannot be provoked after an unsuccessful first middle query).
Simulator. The final step of the proof consists of exhibiting a simulator τ such that ∆ D (H, S simu F ,τ ) is small. The indistinguishability proof is facilitated by defining two hardly distinguishable systems B and B and a wrapper system W such that WB ≡ H and WB ≡ S simu F ,τ . System B works as follows: Initially, it takes a value x ∈ {0, 1} k , computes an encoding c 1 · · · c n ←$ Enc(x) of it, and outputs λ (where the symbol λ indicates an empty output). Then, it repeatedly accepts guesses
Otherwise, it outputs a i = and self-destructs (i.e., all future answers are ). The system B behaves as B except that the initial input x is ignored and the c 1 , . . . , c n are chosen uniformly at random and independently.
The behavior of B (and similarly that of B ) is described by a sequence (p B
is the probability of observing the outputs a i = (λ, a 1 , . . . , a i ) given the inputs g i = (x, g 1 , . . . , g i ). For simplicity, assume below that g i is such that no position is guessed twice (a generalization is straight-forward) and that a i is of the form {λ}{1} * { } * (as otherwise it has probability 0 anyway).
For system B, all i, and any
if a i has s < min(i, t) leading 1's; this follows from the t-wise independence of the bits of Enc(x). All remaining output vectors a i , i.e., those with at least min(i, t) preceding 1's, share a probability mass of 2 − min(i,t) , in a way that depends on the code in use and on x. (It is easily verified that this yields a valid probability distribution.) The behavior of B is obvious given the above (simply replace "t" by "n" in the above description).
Proof. On both systems B and B , one can define an MBO B that is zero as long as less than t positions have been guessed correctly. In the following,B andB denote B and B with the MBO, respectively.
Analogously to the above, the behavior ofB (and similarly that ofB ) is described by a sequence
is the probability of observing the outputs a i = (λ, a 1 , . . . , a i ) and b 0 = b 1 = . . . = b i = 0 given the inputs g i = (x, g 1 , . . . , g i ). One observes that due to the t-wise independence of Enc(x)'s bits, for i < t,
if a i has i leading 1's, and 0 otherwise, and for i ≥ t, Recall that the purpose of the wrapper system W is to emulate H and S simu F ,τ using B and B , respectively. The key point is to note that low queries f can be answered knowing only the positions A(f ) of Enc(x), high queries knowing only the positions in B(f ), and middle queries can always be rejected. A full description of W can be found in Figure 3 . It has an outside interface o and an inside interface i; at the latter interface, W expects to be connected to either B or B . Lemma 6. WB ≡ H.
Proof. Since the distance of the LECSS is d > t, the following holds: A low query results in same if all injected positions match the corresponding bits of the encoding, and in otherwise. Similarly, for a high query, there can be at most one codeword that matches the injected positions. If such a codeword c * exists, the outcome is Dec(c * ) if the bits in the keep-positions match c * , and otherwise . By inspection, it can be seen that W acts accordingly.
Consider now the system WB . Due to the nature of B , the behavior of WB is independent of the value x that is initially encoded. This allows to easily design a simulator τ as required by Definition 3. A full description of τ can be found in Figure 4 . 
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A The Composition Theorem of Constructive Cryptography
The main statement we prove in the main paper shows the security of one protocol step in isolation, i.e., we show for the non-malleable code that it constructs the multi-bit confidential channel from multiple assumed single-bit confidential channels. The composition theorem now states that two such construction steps can be composed: If one (lower-level) protocol constructs the resource that is assumed by the other (higher-level) protocol, then the composition of those two protocols constructs the same resource as the higher-level protocol, but from the resources assumed by the lower-level protocol, under the assumptions that occur in (at least) one of the individual security statements.
The composition theorem was first explicitly stated in [44] , but the statement there was restricted to asymptotic settings. Later, in [36] , the theorem was stated in a way that also allows to capture concrete security statements. The proof, however, still follows the same steps as the one in [44] .
To state the theorem, we make use of a special converter id that behaves transparently (i.e., allows access to the underlying interface of the resource). Furthermore, we assume the operation [·, . . . , ·] to be left-associative; in this way we can simply express multiple resources using the single variable U. Theorem 8. Let R, S, T, U ∈ Φ be resources. Let π = (π 1 , π 2 ) and ψ = (ψ 1 , ψ 2 ) be protocols, σ π and σ ψ be simulators, and (ε 1
where Dσ E ψ and Dπ A 1 π B 2 mean that D applies the converters at the respective interfaces. Moreover 
B Channel Resources
From the perspective of constructive cryptography, the purpose of a public-key encryption scheme is to construct a confidential channel from non-confidential channels. A channel is a resource that involves a sender A, a receiver B, and-to model channels with different levels of security-an attacker E. The main types of channels relevant to this work are defined below with respect to interface set {A, B, E}. All channels are parametrized by a message space M ⊆ {0, 1} * , which is only made explicit in the confidential channel (see below), however.
Insecure multiple-use channel. The insecure channel − → → transmits multiple messages m ∈ M and corresponds to, for instance, communication via the Internet. If no attacker is present (i.e., in case ⊥ E − → → ), then all messages are transmitted from A to B faithfully. Otherwise (for − → → ), the communication can be controlled via the E-interface, i.e., the attacker learns all messages input at the A-interface and chooses the messages to be output at the B-interface. The channel is described in more detail in Figure 5 .
Authenticated (unreliable) single-use channel. The (single-use) authenticated channel •−→, described in Figure 6 , allows the sender A to transmit a single message to the receiver B authentically. That means, while the attacker (at the E-interface) can still read the transmitted message, the only influence allowed is delaying the message (arbitrarily, i.e., there is no guarantee that the message will Figure 5 : Insecure, multiple-use communication channel from A to B.
ever be delivered). The channel guarantees that if a message is delivered to B, then this message was input by A before. There are different constructions that result in the channel •−→, based on, for instance, MACs or signature schemes.
Channel 10 The attacker can then choose messages from the buffer B (by using an index) to be delivered at the B-interface, or inject messages from {0, 1} k which are then also output at the B-interface. Note that E cannot inject messages that depend on those in B, i.e., the confidential channel is non-malleable. It is described in more detail in Figure 7 .
on (inj, m ) at E output m at B Figure 7 : Confidential, multiple-use k-bit channel from A to B.
C Non-Malleable Codes and the One-Time Pad
C.1 The Malleability of the One-Time Pad
The one-time pad encryption scheme is strongly malleable: If a transmitted ciphertext e ∈ {0, 1} n (corresponding to some message m ∈ {0, 1} n ) is replaced by a different ciphertext e ∈ {0, 1} n , then the decryption of e will result in m ⊕ (e ⊕ e ). From the attacker's perspective, the one-time pad is XOR-malleable: By replacing the ciphertext e by e ⊕ δ for some δ ∈ {0, 1} n , he can maul the plaintext from m into m ⊕ δ. This circumstance is captured by the XOR-malleable channel (an {A, B, E}-resource), described in Figure 8 . It allows the sender A to input a single message m. If no attacker is present (i.e., in case 
The proof of (7) is a restricted case of [44, Lemma 2].
C.2 Getting Rid of the Malleability
One can overcome the malleability described above using a non-malleable code secure against the class F bit of tampering functions that modify every bit independently. 11 Thus, assume there exists a (k, n)-coding scheme (Enc, Dec) that is (F bit , 1, 1, ε)-non-malleable for some ε > 0 (according to Definition 3), 12 and consider the following protocol nmc = (encode, decode): Converter encode, obtaining a message m ∈ {0, 1} k at its outside interface, computes c ←$ Enc(m) and outputs c at its inside interface; converter decode, obtaining a message c ∈ {0, 1} n at its inside interface, computes m ← Dec(c ) and outputs m at its outside interface. Proof. The availability condition holds by the correctness of the code. Let F := F bit , S real F := S real F ,1,1 and S simu F ,τ := S simu F ,τ,1,1 , where τ is the simulator guaranteed to exist by Definition 3. Note that a function f ∈ F can be characterized by a vector χ(f ) = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) where f i ∈ {zero, one, keep, flip}, with the meaning that f takes as input a codeword c and outputs a codeword c = c 1 · · · c n in which each bit is either set to 0 (zero), set to 1 (one), left unchanged (keep), or flipped (flip).
Consider the following simulator σ (based on τ ), which simulates the E-interface of n-bit − −⊕→• at its outside interface: When it receives (msg, 1) at the inside interface, it outputs (msg, 1) at the outside interface. When it gets (xor, δ) with δ = δ 1 · · · δ n at the outside interface, it computes x ←$ τ (1, f ), where f is the function such that χ(f ) = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) for If x = (same, 1), σ outputs (dlv, 1) at the inside interface, and otherwise, it outputs (inj, x). Consider the following reduction C, which provides interfaces A, B, and E on the outside and expects to connect to either S real F or S simu F ,τ on the inside: When a message m is input at the Ainterface, C outputs (msg, 1) at the E interface. When (xor, δ) is input at interface E, it computes f the same way τ does and outputs (tamper, f ) at the inside interface. The subsequent response x is output at interface B.
Consider the systems CS real F and encode A decode B n-bit − −⊕→•. The output at the E-interface upon input m ∈ {0, 1} k at the A-interface is the same in in both systems, namely (msg, 1). Moreover, with CS real F the output at the B-interface on input (xor, δ) at the E-interface is computed by applying the tampering function f corresponding to δ to the encoding of the value m; exactly as in encode A decode B n-bit − −⊕→•. Consider the systems CS simu F ,τ and σ E k-bit −→•. Again, when m ∈ {0, 1} k is input at A, (msg, 1) is output at E in either system. In CS simu F ,τ , the output at the B-interface on input (xor, δ) at the Einterface is computed by invoking the simulator τ on the tampering function f corresponding to δ; exactly as in σ E k-bit −→•. Therefore,
D SD-CCA Security and Deferred Material from Section 3
In Section 3, we provide a protocol (a pair of converters) m-pke = (m-encrypt, m-decrypt) that achieves transformation
and results from composing protocol 1-pke = (1-encrypt, 1-decrypt), achieving
with protocol nmc = (encode, decode), achieving
In this section we fill in the deferred details: First, we formally define the notion of self-destruct CCA security (SD-CCA) (Section D.1). Second, we show in detail how protocol 1-pke is obtained from a 1-bit SD-CCA-secure PKE and prove its security (Section D.2). Third, we formally prove Theorem 1, which states that nmc achieves construction (4) (Section D.3). Fourth, we show that protocol m-pke corresponds (in a straight-forward manner) to a PKE scheme Π and prove that Π is SD-CCA secure (Section D.4). Finally, for comparison to our constructive approach we also provide a direct gamebased proof of the fact that combining single-bit SD-CCA-secure PKE with a non-malleable code as shown above yields a multi-bit SD-CCA-secure PKE scheme (Section D.5).
D.1 Formal Definition of SD-CCA
In this section we define SD-CCA security and a replayable variant thereof called SD-RCCA security. The notion of replayable CCA security (RCCA) in general was introduced by Canetti et al. [6] to deal with the artificial strictness of full CCA security. Roughly, RCCA security weakens full CCA security by potentially allowing an attacker to maul a ciphertext into one that decrypts to the identical message.
The only difference between the SD-CCA game and the standard game used to define CCA is that the decryption oracle self-destructs, i.e., it stops processing further queries once an invalid ciphertext is queried. Note that the self-destruct feature only affects the decryption oracle; the adversary is still allowed to get the challenge ciphertext after provoking a self-destruct. The game is phrased as a distinguishing problem between the two systems G sd-cca
output test else output m , where b ∈ {0, 1}, defining SD-CCA security of a PKE scheme Π = (K, E, D). The command self -destruct causes the system to output and to answer all future decryption queries by .
for all distinguishers D with running time at most t and making at most q decryption queries.
be the game that behaves as G sd-cca b , except that it outputs test whenever D sk (e ) ∈ {m 0 , m 1 } for a decryption query e .
D.2 Single-bit Channels from Single-bit PKE
Following the proof of [12, Theorem 2], we first show that a 1-bit SD-CCA-secure PKE scheme can be used to design a protocol 1-pke that achieves the construction
Using the composition theorem, one then obtains
where 1-pke = (1-encrypt , 1-decrypt ) and where 1-encrypt and 1-decrypt are the n-fold parallel composition of 1-encrypt and 1-decrypt , respectively. A slight modification of protocol 1-pke yields the protocol 1-pke for construction (3) . Essentially, all public keys are concatenated and sent via a single ←−•. A proof of security is straight-forward. Towards a proof of (2), let Π = (K, E, D) be a PKE scheme and consider the following pair of protocol converters 1-pke = (1-encrypt , 1-decrypt ): Converter 1-encrypt works as follows: It initially expects a public key pk at the inside interface. When a message m is input at the outside interface, 1-encrypt outputs e ←$ E pk (m) at the inside interface. Converter 1-decrypt initially generates a key pair (pk, sk) using key-generation algorithm K and outputs pk at the inside interface. When 1-decrypt receives e at the inside interface, it computes m ← D sk (e ), outputs m at the outside interface, and if m = , implements the self-destruct mode, i.e., outputs on the outside for all future ciphertexts received on the inside. Theorem 10. There exists a simulator σ and for any ∈ N there exists a (efficient) reduction C such that for every D,
where the additional superscript indicates that the channel processes only the first messages at interface A.
Proof. First, consider the following simulator σ for interface E of 1-bit, − → →•: Initially, it generates a key pair (pk, sk) and outputs pk at the outside interface. When it receives (msg, i) at the inside interface, it generates an encryption e ←$ E pk (m) of some 1-bit messagem, outputs (msg, e) at the outside interface, and records (e, i). When (inj, e ) is input at the outside interface, σ proceeds as follows: If (e , i ) has been recorded for some i , it outputs (dlv, i ) at its inside interface. Otherwise, it computes m ← D sk (e ), outputs (inj, m ) at the inside interface, and if m = , it implements the self-destruct mode: for any future (inj, e ) input at the outside interface it outputs (inj, ) at the inside interface.
Consider now the problem of distinguishing the two systems
A distinguisher D connected to U initially sees a public key at interface E. If D inputs a message m at interface A, an encryption of m (created by 1-encrypt) is output at interface E. When D inputs a ciphertext e at E, it sees a decryption of e (by 1-decrypt) at B. The system V behaves differently: Initially, D also sees a public key. But when it inputs a message m at A, an encryption e ofm is output at interface E (by simulator σ). When e is input at interface E, m is output at B (as σ issues a deliver instruction to the channel). When e = e is input at E, a decryption of e (injected by σ) is output at B. The translation between the channel setting and the game setting is achieved by the following reduction system C : Initially, C takes a value (which will be the public key pk) from the game and outputs it at the E-interface. When a message m is input at interface A of C , (chall, m,m) is output to the game. The resulting challenge e is output as (msg, e) at interface E. When (inj, e) is input at interface E, C outputs m at interface B. When (inj, e ) with e = e is input at interface E, C passes (dec, e ) to the game and outputs the answer m at interface B. If m = , C implements the self-destruct mode: All future (inj, e ) at interface E are handled by outputting at B. We have
and thus
where C := C C and the first inequality follows from a standard hybrid argument for a reduction system C .
D.3 Tying the Channels Together
Theorem 1. For any , q ∈ N, if (Enc, Dec) is (F copy , ε, , q)-continuously non-malleable, there exists a simulator σ such that
Proof. The availability condition holds by the correctness of the code. Let F := F copy , S real F := S real F , ,q , and S simu F ,τ := S simu F ,τ, ,q where τ is the simulator guaranteed to exist by Definition 3.
Consider the following simulator σ (based on τ ), which simulates the E-sub-interfaces of the 1bit confidential channels at its outside interface: When (msg, i) is received at the inside interface, it outputs (msg, i) at each outside sub-interface corresponding to a 1-bit confidential channel. Whenever σ receives one instruction to either deliver 13 ((dlv, i ) for i ∈ N) or inject ((inj, m ) for m ∈ {0, 1}) a bit at each outside sub-interface corresponding to one of the confidential channels, it assembles these to a function f with χ(f ) = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) as follows: For all j = 1, . . . , n,
if the instruction on the j th sub-interface is (inj, 0), one if the instruction on the j th sub-interface is (inj, 1), copy i if the instruction on the j th sub-interface is (dlv, i ).
Then, σ invokes τ to obtain x ←$ τ (i, f ), where i is the number of instructions (msg, i) received at the inside interface so far. If x = (same, j), σ outputs (dlv, j) at the inside interface. Otherwise, it outputs (inj, x ). If x = , σ outputs (inj, ) at the inside interface and implements the self-destruct mode, i.e., outputs (inj, ) at the inside interface for all future inputs to the simulated interfaces of the single-bit channels.
Consider the following reduction C, which provides interfaces A, B, and E on the outside and expects to connect to either S real F or S simu F ,τ on the inside. When a message m is input at the Ainterface, C outputs (encode, m) on the inside. Similarly to σ, it repeatedly collects instructions input at the E-sub-interfaces and uses them to form a tamper function f , which it outputs on the inside as (tamper, f ). Then, it outputs the answer x received on the inside at the B-interface. Additionally, if x = , C implements the self-destruct mode, i.e., subsequently only outputs at interface B.
One observes that
Thus, for all distinguishers D,
D.4 From Protocols to PKE Schemes
The PKE scheme Π = (K, E, D) corresponding to our protocol m-pke can be obtained as follows. The key generation algorithm K generates n independent key pairs of the 1-bit scheme. The encryption algorithm E first encodes a message using a non-malleable code and then encrypts each bit of the resulting encoding independently and outputs the n resulting ciphertexts. The decryption algorithm D first decrypts the n ciphertexts, decodes the resulting bitstring, and outputs the decoded message or the symbol , indicating an invalid ciphertext, if any of these steps fails. The scheme is described in more detail in Figure 10 . PKE scheme Π achieves only replayable SD-CCA security (SD-RCCA). The reason for this is that given any ciphertext e, an attacker can replace the first component of e by a fresh encryption of a randomly chosen bit and thereby obtain, with probability 1/2, a ciphertext e that decrypts to the same message as e. In [6] , the authors provide generic ways to achieve full CCA security from replayable CCA security. As shown in subsequent work [13] to this paper, these techniques can also be applied in the context of self-destruct CCA security. PKE Scheme Π = (K , E , D ) Key Generation K for i ← 1 to n (pk i , sk i ) ←$ K pk ← (pk 1 , . . . , pk n ) sk ← (sk 1 , . . . , sk n ) return (pk, sk)
Encryption E pk (m) c = c 1 · · · c n ← Enc(m) for i ← 1 to n e i ←$ E pk i (c i ) return e = (e 1 , . . . , e n ) It remains to prove that our PKE scheme is indeed SD-RCCA secure, based on the security of protocol m-pke; the proof follows that of [12, Theorem 4] . In the following, let
where σ is an arbitrary simulator.
Theorem 11. There exist efficient reductions C 0 and C 1 such that, for all adversaries D,
Proof. Consider the following reductions C 0 and C 1 . Both connect to an {A, B, E}-resource on the inside and provide a single interface on the outside: Initially, both obtain (msg, pk) at the inside Einterface and output pk at the outside interface. When (chall, m 0 , m 1 ) is received on the outside, C 0 outputs m 0 at the inside A-interface and C 1 outputs m 1 . Subsequently, (msg, e) is received at the inside E-interface, and e is output on the outside by both systems. When a decryption query (dec, e ) is received on the outside, both systems output (inj, e ) at the inside E-interface. A subsequently received message m at B is output on the outside by both systems (as answer to the decryption query) unless m ∈ {m 0 , m 1 }, in which case test is returned. Moreover, if m = , both reduction systems self-destruct, i.e., they answer all future decryption queries by . We have
where the last equivalence follows from the fact that, in V, the input from k-bit − → →• to σ is the same in both systems (the output (msg, 1)) and that decryption queries causing m 0 or m 1 to be output at the B-interface are answered by test. Hence,
D.5 Game-Based Proof
This section contains a direct proof that our k-bit PKE scheme Π is SD-RCCA secure if Π is a SD-CCA-secure 1-bit PKE scheme and (Enc, Dec) a continuously non-malleable coding scheme. The proof is a hybrid argument and is obtained by "unwrapping" the concatenation of the theorems from Sections 3 and D.4. The modular nature and the intuitive simplicity of the proofs in Section 3 are lost, however. Concretely, we prove:
Theorem 12. If Π is a (t+t, q, ε)-SD-CCA secure 1-bit PKE scheme and (Enc, Dec) is a (F copy , ε nmc , 1, q)-non-malleable coding scheme, 14 then Π is a (t, q, 2nε + 2ε nmc )-SD-RCCA PKE scheme, wheret represents a (very) small overhead.
In the following, let F := F copy . Moreover, let G sd-rcca 0 and G sd-rcca 1 be the systems capturing the SD-RCCA security for Π , and similarly G sd-cca 0 and G sd-cca 1 the ones for the SD-CCA security of Π. The proof of Theorem 12 follows from the following lemma: 
where τ is the simulator for the non-malleable code. Moreover, all reductions preserve the number of queries q.
Proof (of Theorem 12). Lett be the maximal occurring overhead caused by the reduction systems C b makes no more decryption queries than D and has running time at most t +t, and DC b makes at most as many tamper queries as D makes decryption queries. Hence,
Towards a proof of Lemma 13, consider the following hybrid systems for b ∈ {0, 1} and i ∈ [n]: H
proceeds as G sd-rcca b except that the challenge query (chall, m 0 , m 1 ) and decryption queries (dec, e ) are handled differently:
• Challenge query: The first i bits of the encoding c = c 1 · · · c n of m b are replaced by uniformly random and independent bits. The resulting n-bit string is then encrypted bit-wise (as done by E). This results in the challenge ciphertext e = (e 1 , . . . , e n ). 
Proof. Fix b and i. System C (i) b works as follows: Initially, it generates n − 1 key pairs (pk j , sk j ) for j ∈ [n] \ {i}, obtains pk i (but not sk i ) on the inside interface (from G sd-cca 0 or G sd-cca 1 ), and outputs pk := (pk 1 , . . . , pk n ) on the outside. When it receives (chall, m 0 , m 1 ) on the outside, it computes an encoding c = c 1 · · · c n ← Enc(m b ). Then, it chooses i random bitsc 1 , . . . ,c i and computes e j = E pk j (c j ) for j < i, and E pk j (c j ) for j > i.
Moreover, it outputs (chall, c i ,c i ) at the inside and obtains a ciphertext e i . It finally outputs e = (e 1 , . . . , e n ) at the outside interface. When C (i) b receives a decryption query (dec, e ) for e = (e 1 , . . . , e n ) at its outside interface, it proceeds as follows: For j = i, it computes c j as H Otherwise, it outputs (dec, e i ) at the inside interface and obtains the answer c i . Then, it computes m ← Dec(c ). If m = , C (i) b implements the self-destruct mode. Otherwise, it outputs m at the outside interface unless m ∈ {m 0 , m 1 }, in which case the output is test.
Consider the systems C . Both systems generate the public key in the same fashion. As to the challenge ciphertext, the first i−1 ciphertext components e j generated by C . The result of a decryption query (dec, e ) sent to C
is Dec(c ) for c = c 1 · · · c n , where c j = D sk j (e j ) unless j < i and e j = e j , in which case c j =c j . Again, the same holds for system
b are compared similarly. Therefore,
which concludes the proof.
Proof. System C b works as follows: Initially, it generates n key pairs (pk i , sk i ) and outputs pk = (pk 1 , . . . , pk n ) at the outside interface. When it receives (chall, m 0 , m 1 ) at the outside interface, it chooses n random valuesc 1 , . . . ,c n , computes e i ←$ E pk (c i ) for i = 1, . . . , n, and outputs e = (e 1 , . . . , e n ) at the outside interface. Additionally, it outputs (encode, m b ) at the inside interface. When it gets a decryption query (dec, e ) with e = (e 1 , . . . , e n ), it proceeds as follows: First, it creates a tamper query f with χ(f ) = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) where
zero if e i = e i and D sk i (e i ) = 0, one if e i = e i and D sk i (e i ) = 1, and keep if e i = e i . Then, it outputs (tamper, f ) at the inside interface and obtains an answer x . If x = , C b implements the self-destruct mode. If x ∈ {m 0 , m 1 }, C b outputs test at the outside interface. Otherwise, it outputs x .
For b ∈ {0, 1}, consider the systems C b S real F and H (n)
b . Both systems generate the public key in the same fashion. Furthermore, in either system, the challenge ciphertext consists of n encryptions of random bits. Finally, both systems answer a decryption query by applying the same tamper function to an encoding of m b before decoding it. When the decoding of the tampered codeword results in m 0 or m 1 , both systems answer test. Thus,
. Due to the fact that test is output when a decryption query results in m 0 or m 1 , the observable behavior is the same in C 0 S simu F ,τ and C 1 S simu F ,τ . 16 Therefore,
Proof (of Lemma 13). Follows immediately from Lemmas 14 and 15 using a triangle inequality.
E Achieving Adaptive Continuous Non-Malleability
Theorem 2. If a (k, n)-coding scheme (Enc, Dec) is continuously (F copy , ε, 1, q)-non-malleable, it is also continuously (F copy , 2 ε + q 2 k , , q)-non-malleable, for all , q ∈ N. Figure 11 : Systems S lor F ,0 and S lor F ,1 defining LORnon-malleability of (Enc, Dec). The self -destruct command has the effect that is output and all future queries are answered by .
Left-or-right non-malleability. The proof of Theorem 2, which uses a hybrid argument, is facilitated by introducing a left-or-right (LOR) variant of non-malleability. The two definitions are equivalent, as shown by Lemmas 16 and 17 below. In the LOR variant, 17 the encode-oracle takes as input pairs of messages and encodes either always the first or always the second message. The goal of the attacker is to find out which is the case. Formally, LOR-non-malleability is defined using the two random systems S lor F ,0 and S lor F ,1 , shown in Figure 11 . 18 When processing a tamper query, if there are multiple indices j for which (same, j) could be output, S lor F ,b outputs the largest such j. As before, for b ∈ {0, 1} and , q ∈ N, S lor F ,b, ,q is the system that behaves as S lor F ,b except that only the first encode-queries and the first q tamper-queries are handled. One observers that
where the third equivalence follows from the fact that the observable behavior of C b S simu F ,τ is independent of the messages C b outputs to S simu F ,τ . Hence, for all attackers A,
Proof. Fix and q, and let S real F := S real F , ,q , S simu F ,τ := S simu F ,τ, ,q (for a simulator τ to be defined next), S lor F ,0 := S lor F ,0, ,q , and S lor F ,1 := S lor F ,1, ,q . Consider the following simulator τ : It internally keeps a counter 1 , which occurs with probability at most i 2 k in each query.
Formally, one can define a monotone binary output (MBO, see Section 2.1) on CS lor F ,0 ; CS lor F ,0 (the system extended by this additional output) and S real F are now conditionally equivalent, and by [45, Theorem 1], the distinguishing advantage ∆ A (CS lor F ,0 , S real F ) is upper-bounded by the probability of provoking this event, which for at most encodeand at most q tamper-queries can be bounded by q 2 k . Hence, for all attackers A,
Lemma 18. If (Enc, Dec) is continuously (F copy , ε, 1, q)-LOR-non-malleable, it is also continuously (F copy , · ε, , q)-LOR-non-malleable, for all ∈ N.
Proof. Fix and q, let F := F copy , and set S b := S lor F ,b, ,q and S b := S lor F ,b,1,q for b ∈ {0, 1}. The distinguishing advantage between S 0 and S 1 is bounded via a hybrid argument, where the i th hybrid H (i) picks x 0 when processing the first i encode queries (encode, x 0 , x 1 ) and x 1 afterwards. For each i, the distinguishing advantage between successive hybrids H (i−1) and H (i) is bounded by exhibiting a system C i that reduces distinguishing S 0 and S 1 to distinguishing the hybrids.
For i = 0, 1, . . . , , hybrid H (i) works as follows: Initialization and (tamper, f ) are defined as with S 0 and S 1 . The first i queries (encode, x 0 , x 1 ) are handled by encoding x 0 , i.e., c (j) ← Enc(x 0 ) for the j th encoding. For all later queries, x 1 is encoded, i.e., c (j) ← Enc(x 1 ).
One observes that H ( ) ≡ S 0 and H (0) ≡ S 1 .
For i = 1, . . . , n, reduction C i works as follows: For the first i − 1 encode queries (encode, x 0 , x 1 ) (at the outside interface), it computes and stores an encoding of x 0 , i.e., c (j) ← Enc(x 0 ) for the j th encoding. Upon the i th query (encode, x 0 , x 1 ), it outputs (encode, x 0 , x 1 ) at the inside interface. (Note that as a consequence, a target encoding c ←$ Enc(x b ) is generated, depending on whether C i is connected to S 0 or S 1 .) The remaining encode queries are handled by encoding the second message x 1 , i.e., c (j) ← Enc(x 1 ).
System C i maintains a counter j that keeps track of the number of encode queries it has encountered. When a tamper query (tamper, f ) with f ∈ F (j) copy and χ(f ) = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) is received at the outside interface, it computes f 1 , . . . , f n , where
Then, it outputs (tamper, f ) at the inside interface, where f is the function in F (1) copy with χ(f ) = (f 1 , . . . , f n ). 19 Let x be the answer to the tamper query at the inside interface. C i computes the set of indices j for which x matches one of the two messages of the j th encode query. Moreover, if x = same, index i is added to that set as well. Then, it outputs (same, j) for the largest index j in the set. If the set is empty, x is output.
Thus, for all adversaries A,
Proof (of Theorem 2). Follows immediately from Lemmas 16, 17, and 18.
F On the Necessity of Self-Destruct
In this section we show that no (k, n)-coding scheme (Enc, Dec) can achieve (even non-adaptive, i.e. for = 1) continuous non-malleability against F copy without self-destruct. This fact is reminiscent of the negative result by Gennaro et al. [29] , and was already observed by Faust et al. [25] (without a proof) for the easier case of strong continuous non-malleability. The impossibility proof in this section assumes that Dec is deterministic and that Dec(Enc(x)) = x with probability 1 for all 
The corollary below states no pair of converters (encode, decode) can achieve the constructive statement corresponding to Theorem 1 without relying on the self-destruct feature.
Corollary 20. For any protocol nmc := (encode, decode) and all simulators σ, if both converters are stateless and
Proof. Note that the protocol achieves perfect availability and thus constitutes a perfectly correct (k, n)-coding scheme (since the converters are stateless and with perfect correctness, decode can w.l.o.g. be assumed to be deterministic). Consider an arbitrary simulator σ. It can be converted into a simulator τ as required by Definition 3 in a straight-forward manner. Similarly, there exists a straightforward reduction C such that
Thus, DC achieves advantage 1 − n+1 2 k .
F.1 Proof of Theorem 19
Distinguisher D := D Ext uses an algorithm Ext that always extracts the encoded message when interacting with system S real F and does so with small probability only when interacting with system S simu F ,τ (for any simulator). . If the answer is same, it sets f i ← zero and otherwise f i ← one. In the end Ext outputs x ← Dec(val(f 1 ) · · · val(f n )).
The Distinguisher. Consider the following distinguisher D Ext : Initially, it chooses x ← {0, 1} k and outputs (encode, x) to the system it is connected to. Then, it lets Ext interact with that system, replacing an answer by same whenever it is x. When Ext terminates and outputs a value x , D Ext outputs 1 if x = x and 0 otherwise.
Proof. Assume that before the i th iteration of Ext, asking the query (tamper, f ) with χ(f ) = (f 1 , . . . , f i−1 , keep, keep, . . . , keep) to S real F yields the answer x. From this it follows that either (f 1 , . . . , f i−1 , zero, keep, . . . , keep) or (f 1 , . . . , f i−1 , one, keep, . . . , keep) leads to the answer x; Ext sets f i appropriately (the fact that the answer x is replaced by same plays no role here). Thus, in the end, computing Dec(val(f 1 ) · · · val(f n )) yields x.
In other words, Lemma 21 means that Ext always succeeds at recovering the value x chosen by D. Showing that this happens only with small probability when D Ext interacts with S simu F ,τ completes the proof.
Proof. Consider the following modified distinguisherD Ext that works as D Ext except that it does not modify the answers received by the system it is connected to. Moreover, letŜ simu F ,τ be the the system that ignores all encode-queries and handles queries (tamper, f ) by invoking τ (1, f ) and outputting τ 's answer.
Note that in both experiments, Ext's view is identical unless it causes τ to output x (the value encoded by D), which happens with probability at most n 2 k . Thus,
Furthermore, in experimentD ExtŜ simu F ,τ , Ext's view is independent of x, and therefore, x is output by Ext with probability 1 2 k . The claim follows.
G Continuous Non-Malleability against Full Bit-Wise Tampering
In this section we show that the coding scheme by [23] is continuously non-malleable against F copy extended with bit flips. The scheme relies on a LECSS (E, D) (cf. Definition 4 in Section 4) and a so-called AMD code (A, V); the latter concept was introduced by [14] . The scheme (Enc, Dec) by [23] is the concatenation of an AMD code and a LECSS, i.e., Enc := E•A and Dec :
The tampering class F copy can be extended to account for bit flips: Let F copy := (F
copy is characterized by a vector χ(f ) = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) where f i ∈ {zero, one, copy 1 , . . . , copy i , flip 1 , . . . , flip i }, with the meaning that f takes as input i codewords (c (1) , . . . , c (i) ) and outputs a codeword c = c 1 · · · c n in which each bit is either set to 0 (zero), set to 1 (one), copied from the corresponding bit in a codeword c (j) (copy j ), or copied and flipped from the corresponding bit in a codeword c (j) (flip j ).
Theorem 23. Let (Enc, Dec) as defined above with a (t, d)-LECSS (k, n)-code for d > n/4 and d > t and a ρ-secure AMD code. Then (Enc, Dec) is (F copy , ε, 1, q)-continuously non-malleable for all q ∈ N and
For brevity, we write F bit for F (1) copy below, with the idea that the tampering functions in F (1) copy only allow to keep or flip a bit or to set it to 0 or to 1. More formally, a function f ∈ F bit can be characterized by a vector χ(f ) = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) where f i ∈ {zero, one, keep, flip}, with the meaning that f takes as input a codeword c and outputs a codeword c = c 1 · · · c n in which each bit is either set to 0 (zero), set to 1 (one), left unchanged (keep), or flipped (flip).
For the proof of Theorem 23, fix q ∈ N and some distinguisher D. For the remainder of this section, let F := F bit , S real F := S real F ,1,q and S simu F ,τ := S simu F ,τ,1,q (for a simulator τ to be determined). 32 Consider the hybrid system H that proceeds as S real F , except that as soon as D specifies a dangerous query f , H self-destructs, i.e., answers f and all subsequent queries with . Lemma 24. ∆ D (S real F , H) ≤ 1 2 t + t n(d/n−1/4) 2 t/2 + ρ.
Proof. Define a successful dangerous query to be a dangerous query that does not decode to . On both systems S real F and H, one can define an MBO B (cf. Section 2.1) that is provoked if and only if the first dangerous query is successful and the self-destruct has not been provoked up to that point.
D proceeds as follows: First, it (internally) interacts with D only. Initially, it stores the message x output by D internally. Then, it handles the tamper queries f by D as follows:
• Low query: If there exists a codeword δ * of the LECSS with ∀i ∈ B(f ) : δ * i = val(f i ) and D(δ * ) = 0, D answers with x. Otherwise, D stops its interaction with D and sends x and all the queries toŜ real F . • Middle query: D stops its interaction with D and sends x and all the queries toŜ real F . • High query: If there exists a codeword c * that agrees with f in positions i where f i ∈ {zero, one}, D answers with Dec(c * ). Otherwise, D stops its interaction with D and sends x and all the queries toŜ real F .
To prove (8) , fix all randomness in experiment D S real F , i.e., the coins of D (inside D ) and the randomness of the encoding (inside S real F ). Suppose D would provoke B in the direct interaction with S real F . In that case all the answers by D are equal to the answers by S real F . This is due to the fact that the distance of the LECSS is d > t; a successful non-dangerous low query must result in the original message x and a successful high query in Dec(c * ). Thus, whenever D provokes B, D provokes it as well.
It remains to analyze the success probability of non-adaptive distinguishers D . Fix the coins of D ; this determines the tamper queries. Suppose there is at least one dangerous query, as otherwise B is trivially not provoked. The query's success probability can be analyzed as in [23] , depending on whether it is a low or a high query, which leads to Γ D (Ŝ real F ) ≤ 1 2 t + t n(d/n−1/4) 2 t/2 + ρ (recall that the MBO cannot be provoked after an unsuccessful first dangerous query).
Simulator. The final step of the proof consists of exhibiting a simulator τ such that ∆ D (H, S simu F ,τ ) is small. The indistinguishability proof is facilitated by reusing the two (hardly distinguishable) systems B and B from Section 4 and the wrapper system W defined in Figure 12 , such that WB ≡ H and WB ≡ S simu F ,τ . System W has an outside interface o and an inside interface i; at the latter interface, W expects to be connected to either B or B . 
output Dec(c * ) at o else self-destruct = δ * i for all i ∈ A(f ). Note that δ * , if existent, is unique due to the fact that f is a low query and that the distance of the LECSS is d > t.
Similarly, for a high query f , there can be at most one codeword that matches the injected positions. If such a codeword c * exists, the outcome is Dec(c * ) if the bits in the keep-positions match c * , and otherwise .
By inspection, it can be seen that W acts accordingly. Consider now the system WB . Due to the nature of B , the behavior of WB is independent of the value x that is initially encoded. This allows to easily design a simulator τ as required by Definition 3. The description of τ is given in Figure 13 . on Observe that the answer by WB to a high query f always matches Dec(c 1 · · · c n ), where for i ∈ A(f ), c i = val(f i ), and for i ∈ B(f ), c i = c i ⊕ val(f i ): If no codeword c * matching the injected positions exists, then Dec(c 1 · · · c n ) = , which is also what WB outputs. If such c * exists and c * i = c i ⊕ val(f i ) for all i ∈ B(f ), the output of WB is Dec(c 1 · · · c n ). If there exists an i ∈ B(f ) with c * i = c i ⊕ val(f i ), WB outputs , and in this case Dec(c 1 · · · c n ) = since the distance of the LECSS is d > t.
The proof of Theorem 23 now follows from a simple triangle inequality. Lemma 27. If (Enc, Dec) is continuously (F copy , ε, 1, q)-LOR-non-malleable, it is also continuously (F copy , · ε, , q)-LOR-non-malleable, for all ∈ N.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 18, except that the reduction system C i computes f v as follows: 
